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Abstract 
This paper estimates the relative efficiency of eight Swedish labor market pro-
grams in reducing the unemployment duration for participants. The analysis 
uses a hazard regression model and a uniquely large and rich administrative 
data set that contains all adult workers who became unemployed during 1995-
1997. We find that programs in which the participants obtain subsidized work 
experience and training provided by firms, have better outcome than classroom 
vocational training. The relative efficiency is similar across demographic and 
skill groups and independent of the timing of the placement. A careful exami-
nation of the assignment process to programs reveals no self-selection, but sub-
stantial administrative-selection. However, the administrative-selection appears 
to be unrelated to the outcome and, thus, should not bias the results. 
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1. Introduction 
Active labor market programs (hereafter programs) constitute a cornerstone of 
the labor market policy in many countries. For instance, the European Union 
and the OECD-countries have in recent years emphasized programs as an im-
portant means to reduce long-term unemployment, see EC (1998) and OECD 
(1996). One main purpose of programs is to increase unemployed workers’ 
employment prospects either by facilitating their job search, improve their 
work habits or augmenting their human capital (Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 
1999). Despite the increasing use of various programs, essential knowledge of 
what characterize successful programs is lacking. This paper offers some evi-
dence of programs’ relative success in decreasing the participants’ unemploy-
ment duration by use of Swedish micro data.  
We focus on two issues. The first one is what type of programs reduces the 
participants’ unemployment duration the most? Does the relative efficiency 
vary between different demographic and skill groups? For example, are some 
programs more useful for low educated workers than for others? Do some pro-
grams stand out as more beneficial to women than to men? Knowledge con-
cerning these questions could be of importance to policy-makers who design 
the programs and take decisions on the program mix. Other decision-makers, as 
caseworkers and unemployed workers, may utilize this information in order to 
choose the program that increases the worker’s employment prospect the most.  
Most previous evaluation studies concern the effects of participation in one 
program compared with non-participation: a question we do not address in this 
paper. It is difficult to draw conclusions on programs’ relative success from 
these studies since they often are not comparable to each other in several im-
portant aspects. The studies stem from different countries or time periods, and 
may concern different demographic or skill groups. Further, they may also use 
different outcome variables and estimation techniques.
1  
The second issue of this paper concerns whether the relative efficiency is af-
fected by the timing of placement in programs. The issue of timing of place-
ment in programs has not received much attention in the evaluation literature. 
There are pros and cons of late placement, (Calmfors, 1994). One advantage is 
                                                      
1 We are aware of three previous studies on programs’ relative efficiency in increasing the par-
ticipants’ employment prospects, namely Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon (1997), Gerfin and 
Lechner (2000) and Ridder (1986). Below, we compare our result to theirs.  IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  4
that late placement makes it easier to avoid participants that can easily find a 
job on their own. A possible disadvantage of late placement is that the treat-
ment effect might be smaller, which would be the case if it becomes more dif-
ficult to restore the unemployed persons’ competitiveness in the labor market 
the more it has been allowed to deteriorate, (Layard et al, 1991). It is likely that 
the disadvantages of late placement vary between programs since they aim at 
giving the participants different treatments. Hence, we investigate whether the 
relative efficiency of the programs is affected by elapsed unemployment dura-
tion. However, we cannot infer from this information whether there is an opti-
mal point of time to leave open unemployment to program participation 
Sweden is, for several reasons, a suitable country for addressing the two is-
sues of programs’ relative efficiency. First, Sweden has a long and large-scaled 
experience of programs. In each year during the last decades, between 2 and 5 
percent of the labor force participated in programs, or put differently: roughly 
one third of the stock of unemployed were in labor market programs. 
Second, the Swedish experience of programs relative efficiency might be of 
interest to policy-makers in other countries as well. Programs that are targeted 
at adult workers have simple eligibility restrictions; in order to be eligible to 
the programs the worker should be registered as unemployed at a local Em-
ployment office. As a consequence, all demographic and skill groups partici-
pate in all programs and we are able to infer the relative efficiency of programs 
for each sub-group.  
The third reason is the existence of large and rich administrative data in 
Sweden. Few other countries are comparable to Sweden in this respect. In this 
study we utilize non-experimental longitudinal micro data produced and pro-
vided by the Swedish National Labor Market Board. The database contains the 
event history of all those who have registered at an Employment office since 
August 1991. As a consequence, it contains information on all workers who 
since then have been eligible to publicly financed programs. For these workers, 
we know the dates of transition between regular employment, unemployment 
and programs. The database also contains information on several worker char-
acteristics and from another database we obtain the worker’s pre-
unemployment wage and working hours.  
The comparison focuses on the eight large-scale programs that were avail-
able for adult workers between June 1995 and December 1997. We restrict the 
analysis to workers who entered their first program and we follow them until 
they found a job or at the most until March 1999. With these restrictions we IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  5
end up with 25 280 individuals. We utilize hazard regression analysis to inves-
tigate the questions of interest. 
The three main conclusions from the analysis are: First, we find that pro-
grams in which the participants obtain work experience and training provided 
by firms, have better outcomes than classroom vocational training. The more 
regular work the participants are allowed to do the better the program is rela-
tive to other ones. Second, we find that the timing of placement in programs 
does not affect the relative efficiency of the programs. Third, the results are the 
same across demographic and skill groups. It can be noted that our findings are 
similar to the ones in previous studies
2. The similarity in the results across stud-
ies, carried out in various countries having different labor market structures and 
policies regarding labor market programs (i.e. eligibility rules, program mix) 
indicate a general validity of the conclusions. 
A crucial issue in all evaluation studies is the selection of participants into 
programs and the consequential selection bias in the results. One strand of the 
literature abstracts from the problem by assuming that the selection of partici-
pants is not based on unobserved characteristics. Another strand allows that 
workers are selected into programs based on unobserved characteristics. It aims 
to take such unobserved heterogeneity into account at the expense of invoking 
model-specific assumptions. Common to most studies in the evaluation litera-
ture is however that the selection process per se is not discussed. It is therefore 
difficult to determine how reasonable different claims about the selection proc-
ess are.  
In this paper we take a third approach that we believe is fruitful for address-
ing the issue of unobserved heterogeneity and the relative efficiency of pro-
grams. We discuss the selection process into different programs with available 
data and, specifically, we investigate what factors that determine in which pro-
gram the worker ends up. Harkman (2000) finds that unemployed workers tend 
to value various programs equally. We find that a worker’s observed character-
istics are relatively unimportant in determining which program he ends up in, 
even though we observe many potentially important characteristics. It is far 
more important to know which Employment office the worker belongs to. Our 
interpretation of the results is that the caseworkers use similar selection criteria 
                                                      
2 Bonnal et. al (1997) use French data from the mid-80’s on young unemployed workers, and 
Ridder (1986) use Dutch data (Rotterdam) from the late 70’s. Gerfin and Lechner (2000) use a 
very large and recent Swiss data set on unemployed adult workers. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  6
within an office but not across offices. It is possible that these office specific 
criteria are based on unobserved characteristics that in turn are correlated with 
unemployment duration. However, we do not find that the relative efficiency of 
programs vary between offices as would be expected in this case and hence we 
are led to believe that the potential selection bias in the result is small.  
This study has some limitations that ought to be mentioned. First, we choose 
to focus on programs’ relative success in reducing unemployment duration. 
The reason is that the main purpose of programs in Sweden as well as in most 
other countries is to prevent long period out of employment (Prop 1997/98:1). 
However, a complete picture of the relative efficiency calls for several com-
parisons between programs. For example, various programs may have different 
effects on participants’ subsequent employment spells as well as on wages. 
Moreover, the programs may affect non-participants differently as well, see 
Calmfors (1994).  
A second restriction of the study is that we do not investigate whether par-
ticipation in any program is better or worse that non-participation. The reason 
is that most Swedish, unemployed workers will end up in a program and hence 
it is difficult to find a comparison group that has not participated in any pro-
grams. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the Swedish la-
bor market programs targeted on adult unemployed workers. In section 3 we 
present the data, formalize the research question and discuss different effects of 
labor market programs. Section 4 is devoted to an in depth discussion of the se-




2. Description of the labor market pro-
grams 
There were eight programs directed to adult unemployed workers that domi-
nated during the investigated period. In Table 1 the main features of these pro-
grams are described. The programs are presented in an order that reflects the 
degree of vocational training. The programs in the bottom of the Table have the 
highest degree of vocational training, whereas the ones in the top of the Table 
have the highest degree of on-the-job practice - in fact, they imply that a regu-
lar job is being carried out. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  7
Some eligibility rules are common to all programs: for example, the worker 
must be registered as unemployed at the local employment office and be in a 
certain age group. All persons in our data set, which is described in section 3, 
qualify for participation on these criteria. A few programs have additional eli-
gibility rules, which are indicated in Table 1. For example, ALU requires that 
the worker collects either UI-benefits or cash assistance. SUBE requires that 
the worker has been openly unemployed for at least six months.  
The first category of programs in Table 1 contains only one program, 
namely self-employment grants, SEMP. Workers with an approved business 
idea and financing plan may receive a self-employment grant for 6 month, 
where the grant usually is equivalent to the worker’s UI-benefits. 
The second category is Subsidized On the Job Training Programs, which 
contains SUBE and TRS. The purpose with SUBE is to increase the workers 
chances of receiving a job offer. Usually there is an agreement between the 
employer, worker and the caseworker that the engagement should continue af-
ter the program ends. In TRS the unemployed worker works as a deputy while 
the regularly employed person gets additional training.  
Three programs are classified as wage and employment subsidies. One goal 
common to these programs is to induce employers to provide job-relevant skills 
to the worker.
3 However, there is a substantial within program variation in what 
type of skills, if any, that is provided. Participants in all three programs are not 
allowed to do work that a regular employed person otherwise would do. Com-
pensation to the employer differs between programs: ALU is the cheapest and 
RW is the most expensive program. API is provided to both private and public 
sector. ALU and RW are usually provided to (non-profit) organizations that are 
not expected to employ new workers if they are not provided with a subsidy. 
Finally, there are two programs, AMU and CAC, in the category classroom 
training services. CAC, which means basic computer training, was actually 
classified as an AMU-program prior to July 1995. More advanced courses in 
computer training are, however, still classified as AMU, at least up to and in-
cluding 1997
4. CAC usually runs for 3 months while AMU courses may vary 
from a couple of days to 30 or 40 weeks. There are both non-vocational and 
                                                      
3 It is actually very difficult to find more precise descriptions of the programs than the one pro-
vided in Table 1. 
4 In 1998, a partly new organization was build up to administer computer courses, the so-called 
Information technology training program. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  8
vocational training provided under the AMU-label. Courses that provide non-
vocational training do not aim to increase the participants’ re-employment 
prospects directly after the program. Rather, non-vocational courses are viewed 
to help workers with weak education to increase their benefits from further 
education or programs. Hence, we exclude participants in non-vocational train-
ing from the analysis. 
Participation in a program may influence the duration of unemployment 
benefits or the replacement ratio. In order to be eligible for UI-benefits
5 the 
worker needs to be a member of an UI-fund for at least 12 months. During this 
period, the worker must have worked at least part-time for six months (at least 
70 hours each month). UI-benefits are paid out for a maximum of 300 working 
days or 60 weeks measured in calendar time. By participating in one program 
for at least six months, or several shorter programs, the worker is eligible for a 
new benefit period of 300 working days. In principal, participation in a pro-
gram makes him eligible for a new benefit period only if he does not drop out 
of the program.  
While participating in a program, the worker receives either the stipulated 
wage rate or receives an allowance equivalent to his unemployment compensa-
tion
6, see Table 1. Workers who receive part-time UI benefits may become eli-
gible for full-time UI-benefits by participating in a program running on full 
time. This opportunity was taken away in 1997. A second possibility to in-
crease the UI-benefit has been to participate in a program that offers higher 
wage than the worker’s pre-unemployment wage.  
 
                                                      
5 For a broader overview of the Swedish UI –system, see Carling et al. (2001). 
6 The benefit level is based on the worker’s pre-unemployment wage and working hours. In 
1995, the replacement ratio was 80 percent of pre-unemployment earnings up to a ceiling of 15 
510 SEK in monthly earnings. The replacement ratio was cut from 80 to 75 percent in 1996 and 
at the same time the ceiling was increased to 16 544 SEK. The replacement ratio was restored to 
80 per cent in September 1997.Workers that are not eligible for UI benefits may receive “cash 
assistance” (kontant arbetsmarknadsstöd, KAS). Compensation from KAS is much lower than 
the UI benefits and is not earningsrelated. The daily compensation was 245 SEK in 1995 and 230 
SEK in 1996. These figures compares to approximately 40 percent of the maximum compensa-
tion from UI-benefits.  KAS is paid out for a maximum of 30 weeks (150 working days). It is not 
possible for a worker with cash assistance to become eligible for UI-benefits by participating in a 
labor market program. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  9


















Purpose: Provide the worker 
with an opportunity to start up a 
new business. The worker needs 
approval of a business idea and 
a financing plan in order to be 
eligible for SEMP. ALU or 
AMU may precede SEMP with 
the purpose to help the worker 
prepare himself for self-
employment. 
Costs
*: 9 689 SEK. 











Purpose: makes it easier for 
worker to receive a regular job 
offer. Subsidized regular em-
ployment of long-term unem-
ployed (> 6 months in 1997) 
workers. The engagement is ex-
pected to continue after program 
ends.  
Costs
*: 5 968 SEK. 
Mainly private 
firms. Some sectors 
are excluded due to 
EC employment 








350 SEK per 
day or 50 per-






Purpose: gives the worker ex-
perience of a regular job and 
help employers increase the 
employees’ competence. Com-
bines training for an employed 
worker with a possibility of a 
deputy ship for an unemployed 
worker. 
Costs
*: 7 665 SEK. 
Mainly work in the 
public sector and, 
in particular, health 
and related com-








350 SEK per 
day or 50 per-
cent of the wage 
costs. The edu-
cational costs of 
the employee 
are subsidized. 




Purpose: sustain work experi-
ence, give worker new employer 
references. The program may 
also be offered workers that 
wish to try a new occupation. 
The participant should only 
carry out work that would oth-
erwise not have been done 
Costs
*: 6 993 SEK. 





Employer pays 3 
000 SEK. (2 000 
prior to 1998) 
and 1 000 SEK 
for non Swedish 
citizens 
*  Measured as monthly total cost per participant (AMS 1998a ).  IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  10
        The Table continues on next page. 













Wage and employment subsidies:      
Relief work 
(RW) 
Purpose: Increase labor demand 
in periods with high unemploy-
ment. The program should offer 
the worker an opportunity to 
practice his/her skills and also to 
avoid UI-benefit exhaustion. 
Mainly temporary jobs in the 
public sector. The participant 
should only carry out work that 
would otherwise not have been 
done. 
Costs
*: 9 201 SEK. 
Mainly municipali-








Maximum of 50 
percent of the 
wage costs or 7 





Purpose: avoid UI-benefits ex-
haustion and help the participant 
keep in touch with working life. 
Worker must have UI-benefits 
or cash assistance in order to be 
eligible. The participant should 
only carry out work that would 
otherwise not have been done 
Costs
*: 9 294 SEK 
Almost 90 % of 
ALU programs is 











Purpose: Reduce bottlenecks in 
the labor market by providing 
skills necessary for particular 
jobs in excess demand. 
Costs
*: 13 940 SEK. 
Mainly targeted on 
technical, manufac-










Purpose: increase basic com-
puter knowledge in the labor 
force. Training is usually com-
bined with other activities. CAC 
was not available for workers 
older than 25 years in 1995-96. 
Costs
*: 7 269 SEK. 




*  Measured as monthly total cost per participant, see National Labor Market Board (1998).  
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3. Data, research question, and results 
We utilize a data set containing event history data on all unemployed workers 
registered at the public Employment offices in Sweden since August 1991. 
Registration at an Employment office is compulsory for workers who receive 
unemployment compensation. For workers not entitled to unemployment com-
pensation registration is voluntary but required for those who want full service 
at the office and access to labor market programs. The latter must be stressed 
because it implies that registration is necessary for being eligible to publicly fi-
nanced programs. 
The database contains detailed information on the worker’s unemployment 
spells. For example, the date when he register at the employment office, the 
date he starts a program, what type of program, the date when he leaves the 
program, and the date when his case is closed at the employment office and for 
what reason (job, education etc.). We also have information on the individual’s 
age, education, and immigrant status, in what occupations he searches for jobs, 
and whether he has education and experience that occupation. We also know if 
the worker receives UI-benefits or KAS. We also a potential indicator of unob-
served heterogeneity. The caseworker classify the workers by their needs of 
service when the workers register at the employment office. We select all 
workers that register (directly) as openly unemployed: Within this group work-
ers are put into three categories; i) can take a job immediately, ii) in the need of 
guidance, and iii) waiting for a program. The third category is very small and 
we do not separate it in the first one. However the second is larger and in Table 
A1 the percentage of workers in the second category in each program (see vari-
able Assigned code 12).  IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  12

















          





















































Number  of  programs  1.06 1.17 1.30 1.63 1.94 1.77 1.85 1.75 
Number of participants  3 048  1 006  753  5 383  5 006  1 006  6 251  2 827 
Notes: 
* Includes time spent in (possible) further programs, no adjustment for censoring is made. 
Other (control) variables are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
We restrict the analysis to those individuals aged 25-54, who became unem-
ployed  for the first time between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 1997 and 
who started one of the eight programs discussed in section 2.
7 We follow the 
participants until they find a job or for other reasons leaves the Employment of-
fice. The observation window is closed at 15 March 1999. 1 January 1995 is 
chosen as first sampling date because after this date we have more detailed in-
formation on the type of program each worker participates in. Only workers 
who are openly unemployed when they register at the Employment office are 
included in the sample.
8 A second restriction is that we focus on the effect of 
                                                      
7 The sampling window is 1995-1998 (including early 1999) and thus the results are relevant for 
that specific time period. There are however some details concerning the officials' coding of the 
programmes that ought to be mentioned. SEMP was not coded as a program prior to May 1, 
1995, nor was API and CAC prior to July 1, 1995. This means that the very small fraction of 
workers who became unemployed early 1995 and entered one of the three programs before the 
summer will not be in the data. Moreover, as of January 1, 1998 the three programs SUBE, TRS, 
and RW are collapsed into one (new) code. We have excluded these observations as we can not 
correctly determine which of the three programs those workers participated in. To confirm that 
the results are not altered by our choice of excluding this subset of workers, an additional analys 
was performed where all workers who entered a program 1998 or later were excluded. 
8 Some workers register at the Office since they anticipate future unemployment. These workers 
are excluded from the sample. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  13
the first program that the individuals participate in, see also discussion in sub-
sections 3.1 and 3.2.
9  
In total we have 25 280 workers. The mean values of worker characteristics 
are presented in Table A1 in appendix 1. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics on 
some key variables. A few things are worth noting. Firstly, the unemployment 
duration prior to participation does not vary a great deal between programs. For 
most programs the duration of unemployment is about half a year. The excep-
tion is unsurprisingly ALU which is often used as a means to avoid exhaustion 
of unemployment benefits for eligible workers at risk (see Table 1). 
It can also be noted that it is not uncommon to see a program followed by 
other programs. In general, the longer the duration of the post-program unem-
ployment, the likelier the entrance into a new program, see further discussion in 
section 3.1. 
The Table shows the duration of the program. This is, however, the ob-
served duration, which might differ from the intended (or the maximal) dura-
tion. Nevertheless, most programs appear to run for about 4-5 months. 
 
3.1 Definition of the effects of program participation  
Our choice is to focus on the effect of programs on the participant’s re-
employment prospects.
10 We distinguish between three effects of participation, 
defined by their occurrence in time. The third and last effect is the treatment ef-
fect, which is the effect on the participant’s re-employment prospect once the 
program is completed. This effect could for example be the result of improved 
search techniques, reduced depreciation of already acquired skills, or that the 
participant acquired new and more valuable skills. Some programs may also 
                                                      
9 If we would extend the analysis to cover all programs a person may participate in, the analysis 
would quickly become unfeasible. The reason is that the number of parameters would increase 
very quickly while the number of observations in each combination of programs would decrease. 
10 We ignore wage effects and effects on employment duration participation in programs. We 
also ignore partial effects of ALMP on non-participants (for example, direct displacement ef-
fects) and ”economy wide” or general equilibrium effects (For a more complete list of potential 
effects of ALMP, see Calmfors, 1994)). The analysis in this paper will not provide a measure of 
what would happen if a program were removed altogether (Carling and Larsson, 2000). Many 
studies measure the impact of ALMPs on income or hourly wage. In Sweden, increased income 
has not been an explicit goal of ALMP. Rather ALMP has been a measure to maintain a com-
pressed wage structure that was enforced in the 1960s and 1970s by strong and coordinated un-
ions. By reshuffling displaced workers from shrinking industries with excess supply of labor to 
expanding ones with excess demand, increased wages in the expanding industries were to be 
avoided. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  14
reveal new information to a potential employer about the participant’s produc-
tivity and thereby increase his employment prospect with that employer (or 
other employers). A second (negative) effect of the program, the locking in ef-
fect, arises if the participant’s search efforts are reduced during the program. 
For example, a worker may reduce his search effort if he finds the program at-
tractive due to a high program-compensation, a large treatment effect or, be-
cause participation does not leave much time to search for a regular job. Edin 
and Holmlund (1991) find evidence, using Swedish data on young persons and 
displaced workers, that persons who participate in relief jobs find regular jobs 
at a slower pace than those that are openly unemployed. 
The first effect is the so-called announcement effect on the worker’s re-
employment prospect once he is informed that he is accepted to a program. 
Programs may have different announcement effects because of different lock-
ing-in- and treatment effects. 
Obviously, if the goal of the programs is to reduce the time out of regular 
employment, programs should ”ideally” have a large positive treatment effect 
and as small as possible negative locking-in and announcement effects on the 
probability to find and accept a new regular job. In order to identify all three ef-
fects we need information on the announcement date, when the program starts 
and ends, and whether the worker completed the program or dropped out.  
The data set contains information on the date the worker becomes unem-
ployed and when he enters a program as well as how long he stays in the pro-
gram. Unfortunately, we do not know whether he dropped-out or completed it. 
We also have information on the unemployment duration after the first pro-
gram and on participation in subsequent programs. Hence, we are able to com-
pare net-effect of the locking-in and treatment effects of the various programs. 
We are not, however, able to estimate the relative differences in announcement 
effects because we do not know the date the workers are informed about the 
program. By assuming that the announcement effects are similar between pro-
gram
11 we address the question; what would be the change in expected unem-
ployment duration if an eligible individual was picked at random and moved 
from one program to another?  
                                                      
11 This may be a strong assumption. However, we have contacted several caseworkers in order to 
find out when the worker is offered a program. Usually the program starts within one or two 
weeks after the announcement day. However, the AMU program may start several weeks after 
the announcement day.  IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  15
In the sample, more than 50 percent of the workers participate in only one 
program. Approximately 75 per cent participate in two programs or less, and 5 
per cent of the sample participates in four programs or more. These figures may 
indicate a potential endogeneity problem if, for example, the unemployed 
worker and the caseworker decide upon a whole sequence of programs instead 
of just the first program. In this case the workers behavior prior to, during, and 
after the first program is affected by the knowledge that he will participate in a 
second program. However, we believe that such an agreement between the 
worker and the caseworker is unlikely. The main reason is that we focus on the 
effect of the first program, which usually starts after 4.5 month of open unem-
ployment. The official policy is that all workers who have been unemployed 
for 6 months have the right to have a “plan of action.” The worker and the 
caseworker should jointly produce this document. Approximately 27 percent of 
workers who were unemployed for the first time in 1997 had such an agree-
ment with their caseworkers (AMS, 1998b). 
However, the fact that unemployed workers participate in more than one 
program calls for a careful interpretation of the results. Participants in programs 
that turn out to be the least helpful are more likely to be offered a second pro-
gram which in turn may produce new announcement-, locking-in- and treat-
ment effects. We include the time spent in additional programs in the unem-
ployment duration after the first program, see Table 2. Hence, in our analysis 
the effect of potential additional programs is assigned the first program.  
 
 
3.2 The empirical method 
In this section we will be specific about the method we use to address the 
evaluation question. In the next subsection we present the results. In the interest 
of clarity, we postpone the critical discussion of the method to section 5. 
  First some notations, let T denote the duration of unemployment from 
the start of the program until a job is reported.
12 Let λ denote the hazard func-
tion for T and D the program state, of which there are eight indexed by j=1,...,8. 
For simplicity, assume a homogenous population of unemployed being as-
signed, after a fixed elapsed unemployment duration, to only one of the pro-
                                                      
12 An individual is considered to exit unemployment to employment the date he leaves the Em-
ployment office with the reason that he found a job or if he is register as “on a temporary job”. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  16














A relative comparison of the eight programs contains 7! such parameters (or 
more precisely, functions).
13 
Suppose the timing of the program matters for the relative comparison of 
the outcome and that the elapsed unemployment duration,  e T , varies at ran-




















Furthermore, the individuals are likely to come from a heterogeneous popula-
tion, and the effect may therefore vary across participants. Let X denote a set of 
characteristics pertaining to the participant, where the set can contain individ-
ual-specific as well as environment-specific features. To incorporate the het-
erogeneous effects, we define 
(3) ()
()
















The parameter in (3) implies a formidable evaluation problem, particularly if X 
is an infinite set. This is so since sufficient pre-stratification is not possible 
even in an ideal randomized setting, and post-stratification will not necessarily 
produce consistent estimates of the effects. Thus, by necessity we assume that 
X is a finite set and that we measure it satisfactorily.
14 
                                                      
13 Now, one could consider other definitions of counterfactual states, but we prefer this one for 
reasons that will be made clear in section 4. 
14 It is well known that estimates of hazards models might be sensitive to omitted variables, i.e. 
unobserved heterogeneity: the estimates tend to biased towards zero. Hence the relative order of 
the programs is not affected by the presence of unobserved characteristics unless workers are not 
selected into programs based on these characteristics. Nevertheless there exist methods that at-
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The conditional hazard model for each program is on the following form, 
 
(4) [] () () j e j
j
e
j t x t x t t γ β λ λ + = exp , | 0 .
 
By assuming a piece-wise linear hazard in each time-interval, the discrete time 
hazard can be written as: 
 
(5) [] () [ ] { } t t x x t t h
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j j dw w t 0 ln λ η  and  l ∆  is the length of the l:th time-
interval. We consider intervals of 30 days ranging from zero to 1110 days. The 
log likelihood function, given the model in (5), for a sample of n random ob-
servations on 
j T  and c is: 
 
(6) 



























exp exp 1 ln , , ln
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where  1 = i c  if the unemployment was observed to be terminated for a spell of 
employment and zero otherwise. The function is maximized with respect to its 
arguments.
15  
The specification in (4) allows for a program-specific hazard as well as pro-
gram-specific effects of the control variables. At this step we have about 1000 
free parameters to estimate. We are, however, trying to balance parsimony and 
completeness, by arriving at an acceptable simplification of this general speci-
fication: The basic strategy is to compare the estimates, pertaining to the con-
trol variables, obtained from each hazard, based on specification (4), to a more 
restricted specification. This is done by comparison of the program-specific es-
                                                                                                                                 
tempt to adjust for unobserved heterogeneity. However we prefer not apply them for reasons dis-
cussed in Narendranathan and Stewart (1993).  
15  Starting values are obtained from the Approximate Maximum Likelihood method (Carling, 
1995), and used in conjunction with the BHHH algorithm (see Carling and Söderberg, 1998). IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  18
timate with the one obtained if the control variable is specified to have equal 
effect on all programs. If the deviance of these two estimates are within two 
standard errors, it is considered acceptable to use the latter, i.e. the restricted 
specification. The deviance (presented as a t-ratio) and the estimates are pre-





We follow the terminology of Angrist and Krueger (1998) and make a distinc-
tion between causal variables and control variables. The estimates pertaining to 
the control variables are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. Below, we focus 
on the causal variables, i.e. program state and interaction terms. 
Consider first the question of the relative efficiency of the programs. Figure 
1 shows the survival curves, i.e. the fraction that still has not left unemploy-
ment for a job, for the eight programs. The survival curve is evaluated for an 
average program-participant, i.e. an individual assumed to hold characteristics 
identical to the average in the data set.
 16  
                                                      
16 The effects of the programs are quite homogenous, and it is thus sufficient to make the com-


































Figure 1. The survival curve for an average program participant.
Clearly, the curves hold no simple relation and thus there is no simple statistic 
that can express the relative difference of two programs. In Table 3 we present 
some statistics, 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th percentile, for the programs 
that will aid in comparing the programs. 
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Table 3. Percentile-statistics (days until a job is found) derived from the model for an 
average participant. 
Program percentile 
 90  75 50 25 10 
SEMP 171  228 303 406 543 
SUBE 84  130 201 314 558 
TRS 61  158 278 527 882 
API 59  180 336 657 >1110 
RW 80  219 448 869 >1110 
ALU 89  294 543 1032 >1110 
AMU 61  203 416 755 >1110 
CAC 60  202 475 940 >1110 
The percentile gives the fraction, derived from the model, that has not yet 
found an employment within the stated number of days. 
Let the median be a reasonable statistic for making a comparison of the pro-
grams. It ranges from 201 days (SUBE) to 543 days (ALU). In other words, the 
model predict that, for a stock of eligible and homogenous workers, 50 % of 
the participants would have found a job within half a year if they entered in the 
program SUBE. Had they entered the program ALU, it would have taken them 
one and a half year. 
Figure 1 and the Table 3 above refer to the basic model of no heterogeneous 
effect. Next we consider the second question of the timing effect of the pro-
gram, i.e. we check whether the effect of the program depends on the unem-
ployment duration preceding the program. In doing so, it has been necessary to 
introduce some restrictions on the model. Specifically, it is imposed that the 
baseline hazard is proportional across programs. The second column in Table 4 
gives the relative difference (%) between programs as the difference in the haz-
ards (it can be compared to the difference in median duration as presented in 
Table 3). Extending the model to include interaction between program and tim-
ing does not affect the ranking of the programs. In fact, it hardly has any affect 
on the estimates at all. The timing is defined as the deviation from the average 
duration until a program is entered. The last column shows that the relative 
outcome of the program is insensitive to the timing. There are two exceptions, 
though: for CAC and ALU, the conditional probability of exiting to a job is de-
creasing the later the program is entered. This might follow as a consequence IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  21
of selection where less fortunate workers enters at a slower rate than more for-
tunate ones.
17 Nevertheless, it appears that the ranking of the programs is not 
affected by the timing. 
 
 
Table 4. The effect of timing. The second column shows the relative efficiency 
of the programs before controlling for timing, the third after controlling for tim-
ing.  
Program  Restricted model. No in-
teraction 
Restricted model with in-
teraction with prior dura-
tion 
Interaction effect 
SEMP -21.5 -23.8 -4.0 
SUBE 0 0 5.2 
TRS -38.1 -37.7 -3.3 
API -68.1 -71.2 -6.1 
RW -96.3 -100.5 -11.9 
ALU -125.1 -119.9 -23.1 
CAC -101.8 -102.6 -25.9 
AMU -89.1 -92.4 -6.7 
Assuming that the participants in the programs are made comparable by ad-
justment for the control variables, we can now draw three conclusions. First, 
we find that programs that imply practice at an employer (SUBE, SEMP, TRS 
and API) have a better outcome in terms of expected time out of regular em-
ployment than programs that are characterized by vocational training (AMU 
and CAC). The more similar a program is to a regular job the better it is rela-
tive to others. Second, we find that the timing of placement in programs does 
not affect the relative efficiency of the programs. Third, the results are the same 
across demographic and skill groups. 
We note, finally, that we have performed several checks of the results. We 
have tried extended definitions of the outcome variable to include exit to regu-
lar education or attrition or both. Moreover, we have excluded non UI-
                                                      
17 The explorative data analysis suggested that UI-benefit might affect the relative comparison of 
the programs. Additional analysis, allowing for interaction between program and UI-status, indi-
cated, however, only minor changes in the pattern. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  22
recipients, high- and low-income earners, and foreign citizens. These tests have 
not changed the conclusions. 
 
 
5. Is the process of program assignment 
equivalent to randomization? 
The identification of the causal effects hinges critically on the presumption that 
we observe and control for all the factors that jointly determine the program as-
signment and unemployment duration. In this section we will analyze the as-
signment process with available data.  
There are at least two agents involved in the choice of program - the unem-
ployed worker and his caseworker. If these agents have access to and act on in-
formation that is unobserved by us, our analysis is subject to selection bias. 
Firstly, we discuss which of the agents that can be presumed to be the driving 
force in the assignment of the program. Secondly, we discuss what factors that 
may influence the assignment.  
A recent study by Harkman (2000) indicates that unemployed workers value 
different programs equally. Harkman uses survey data in which openly unem-
ployed, i.e. eligible, workers were interviewed about their interest in participat-
ing in different programs. A correlation analysis shows that if a worker is inter-
ested in participating in one program, he is equally likely to be interested in 
participation in another program as well.
18 The study by Harkman also shows 
that the motive for participating in a program is not primarily the potential in-
crease in employability. Instead, the workers indicate social reasons to be the 
most important ones. Thus, it appears that workers’ self-selection into different 
programs is a minor problem in this study. Harkman’s study also shows that the 
decision  - to participate in any of the programs or to not participate  - ap-
pears to be based on factors unobserved by us. More specifically, a worker’s 
subjective likelihood of employment turns out to be quite important in explain-
ing the overall interest for program participation.
19 
                                                      
18 The workers could choose between 5 alternative answers to the question ranging from very in-
terested to not at all interested. Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation ranged from 0.4 to 0.6.  
19 We also control for elapsed duration of unemployment which potentially may cause selection 
bias in the results. Refeering to Harkman's results above, we think of the participation-decision 
as a two stage decision problem. In the first one, the worker decides whether or not he wants to 
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The caseworkers, on the other hand, seem to have a clear view of what type 
of program is suitable to their clients (Harkman, 2000). In the survey, case-
workers were asked to judge how suitable six programs were to a worker they 
earlier had given consultation to. A correlation analysis of the caseworkers’ 
judgements gave zero correlation between programs.
20 Thus, we are led to be-
lieve that the caseworkers are the driving force in selecting the program. This 
belief is further enforced by the caseworkers’ subjective claim that the decision 
could be attributed to the individual in less than a quarter of the cases, rather 
they attribute the decision to themselves in the majority of cases.  
What decision rules do caseworkers then use? We say that the caseworkers 
use the same decision rule if they, in similar circumstances, assign a given 
sample of workers identically to different programs. Briefly, caseworkers’ de-
cision rules are probably influenced by many factors, like his preferences, in-
centives, experiences, the colleagues’ opinion on the relative efficiency, as well 
as instructions from regional and central decision-makers. Crucial to our study 
is the question of whether caseworkers coordinate their decision rules. If all 
caseworker act idiosyncratically, and if they are the driving force in the choice 
of program, we identify the causal effects (see further discussion in footnote 
14).  
Do caseworkers coordinate their decision rules? We show below that a 
worker’s office affiliation is far more important than his observed characteris-
tics in determining which program he ends up in, even though we observe 
many potentially important characteristics of the worker. This finding is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that caseworkers do coordinate their decision rules 
based on worker characteristics within an office but not across offices. It is 
possible, though, that the decision rules within offices are partly based on un-
observed characteristics that are correlated with unemployment duration. How-
                                                                                                                                 
participate in a program. This decision is based on characteristics that are unobserved by us, see 
above and consequently elapsed unemployment duration is informative on unobserved heteroge-
neity. However, we do not analyse this decision. Instead our focus is on the second step, in which 
the choice of program is made (given a decision to participate in any program). We believe and 
argue above that this decision is based on unobserved heterogeneity to a less extent than the first 
step. Note further, that we allow for interaction effects between the programs and elapsed unem-
ployment duration. 
20 The question is asked to caseworker after the workers that have escaped open unemployment 
to, for example, employment or program participation. Unfortunately, there was no way to exam-
ine the consistency of preferences across caseworkers. Further, the survey does not investigate 
whether the caseworkers believe participation is preferable to non-participation.  IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  24
ever, the analysis in Section 4 gave no significant differences between offices 
in the relative efficiency of programs. Such differences would be expected if 
offices use different decision rules based on unobserved characteristics which 
in turn are correlated with the time out of regular employment.  
Why would caseworkers coordinate their decision rules within an office and 
not across offices? First, presumably caseworkers at the same office have 
greater opportunities to share experiences and jointly discuss what decision 
rules to use. Second, the instructions from the National labor market board are 
rather general and loosely formulated. Much discretion is therefore left to the 
Employment office and to the caseworker. Further, the offices are relatively 
autonomous; see discussion by Nyberg and Skedinger (1997). Third, there is no 
systematic and coherent information available on the relative efficiency of pro-
grams. 
In the empirical analysis below we investigate the importance of (observed) 
worker characteristics, Employment office affiliation as well as local labor 
market conditions for the choice of program in a multinomial logit model. This 
method estimates the relative probability that a worker will participate in a pro-
gram instead of a (comparison-) program. In the next step we calculate whether 
it is the worker’s characteristics or his Employment office affiliation that con-
tribute the most to the variance in the predicted relative probabilities, see ap-
pendix B for a more detailed description of the applied method. 
We observe several characteristics of the worker that are potentially impor-
tant for the choice of program. These characteristics are obtained at consulta-
tion talks between the caseworker and the worker. We also include the 
worker’s wage (from the administrative AKSTAT register) although this in-
formation is not necessarily revealed to the caseworker.
21  
                                                      
21 We have also made a complementary check for selection on unobserved characteristics. The 
idea is to test whether the past labour market situation can be explained by the present program 
state. If this is the case, then selection on unobservables seems important as it would imply a dif-
ference between programs in the participant's past labour market situation (and thus, most likely, 
a difference in the future situation even in the absence of any program effect). We can think of 
three potentially valid measures of past labour market situation; past employment history, past 
unemployment history, and previous wage. We have no access to the first one nor can the second 
one be used as we only include workers who are unemployed for the first time. Hence, we will 
use previous wage as a measure of the worker's past labour market situation. The wage is re-
gressed on standard human capital variables like education, work experience, age et cetera, as 
well as present program state. We find the program state to be statistically insignificant and the 
point estimates to indicate a difference of at the most two percent. There is one exception how-
ever; The participants in the Self-employment grants (SEMP) have considerably higher previous 
 IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  25
In our data 442 Employment offices are represented. Usually there is one 
Employment office in each municipality. In bigger cities there are several of-
fices, specialized in certain sectors, like mediating work to health care or manu-
facturing industry. In the data, 60 percent (265 Offices) have had participants in 
at least seven of the eight programs. It would be unfeasible to estimate 442 (or 
265 for that sake) separate office effects. Instead, we use a random sample of 
20 % from the 265 Offices, in order to reduce the number of parameters to be 
estimated.
22 We also control for annual averages of the unemployment ratio as 
well as the ratio of program participants and total unemployment in the mu-
nicipality.  
We estimate a multinomial logit model (MLM), which provides estimates of 
the set of probabilities that a worker will end up in the eight programs. We 
switch the comparison program seven times in order to relate all programs to 
each other. The results are presented in Table 5. The comparison program is 
indicated in the first row of the Table 5. The entries in the Table report the rela-
tive contribution to the variance of the predicted probabilities from Employ-
ment office affiliation and worker characteristics, see Appendix B for more de-
tails. The ratio is greater than one if workers’ office affiliation contribute more 
than the workers’ characteristics to the variance in predicted probabilities. The 
results in Table 5 show that office affiliation is far more important than the 
wide array of observed characteristics of the worker in determining which pro-
gram he will end up in (the ratio is greater than one). Between CAC/API, 
SEMP/API, SEMP/TRS, and SEMP/CAC worker characteristics are more im-
portant than office affiliation (the ration is less than one). The analysis in Sec-
tion 4 gave that self-employment grants (SEMP) is the second best program in 
reducing unemployment times. Computer/activity center (CAC) on the other 
hand, came out as one of the worst programs. Hence it is possible that workers 
with relatively favorable observed labor market characteristics end up in 
SEMP, while workers with less favorable characteristics end up in CAC. All 
other comparisons between the programs indicates that office affiliation is 
more important than worker characteristics in determining which program the 
worker will enter. 
                                                                                                                                 
wage (about 10 %) than participants in the other programs. Hence, the estimate for this program 
is likely to be subject to selection bias. The magnitude of this bias is unknown however. 
22 In order to make the estimations converge we randomly re-coded some observations at offices 
with participants in 7 programs only. The conclusions are not sensitive to this re-coding. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  26
Table 5. The relative contribution of variance from Offices and observed char-
acteristics of the individuals. The columns indicate which program that is used 
as base. The first row indicates which program that is used as the comparison 
program in the estimations. 
Comparison 
program => 
ALU  API  RW SUBE TRS AMU CAC SEMP 
ALU -     
API 1.51  -    
RW 1.86  2.41 -    
SUBE 1.12  2.34 1.55 -    
TRS 2.37  1.24 2.31 2.07 -    
AMU 1.75  1.95 1.78 1.78 2.41 -    
CAC 2.87  0.91 3.13 2.08 1.70 2.67 -   
SEMP 1.55  0.50 1.34 1.49 0.98 1.31 0.84  - 
Note: Number of observations are 4 076. 
 
This analysis might have some limitations however. One would be if the un-
employed workers are selected to programs based on unobserved heterogeneity 
in which case the MLM-analysis might be biased. The direction of the bias de-
pends on the correlation between the observed and unobserved characteristics. 
If the correlation is negative, the effect of observed characteristics will be un-
derestimated and hence worker characteristics will appear to be less important 
than they truly are. We cannot exclude this possibility. 
Other factors may affect the analysis as well. For example, it is possible that 
the distributions of observed and unobserved worker characteristics vary across 
offices, or that the structure of industry varies between offices. Such differ-
ences may undesirably turn up as Employment offices’ effects. Hence, in a sen-
sitivity analysis we restrict the empirical analysis to three northern counties and 
three counties in the mid-Sweden respectively. In these analyses we excluded 
bigger cities. The results are similar to the one presented in Table 5. 
 
6. Discussion 
In this paper we estimate the relative success of eight Swedish programs in re-
ducing the participants’ unemployment times. The results show that programs IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  27
in which the participants obtain (subsidized) work experience and training pro-
vided by firms, have better outcomes than programs providing classroom voca-
tional training. Further, the more regular work the participants are allowed to 
do, the better the program is relative to other ones. The relative efficiency is not 
affected by the timing of placement in programs. These results are the same 
across demographic and skill groups. 
Why would classroom vocational training have a less favorable outcome 
than the programs providing firm-related work experience and training? One 
explanation is naturally that our results are biased due to selection of workers 
into programs based on unobserved characteristics. We perform a careful ex-
amination of the selection process but some uncertainty concerning this issue 
remains, as it always will in empirical analysis. However, we like to point at 
two facts that suggest this to be an inconsequential problem. Firstly, the magni-
tude of the estimated effects is quite large
23. Secondly, the ranking of the pro-
grams, according to the obtained results, is coherent: pointing unambiguously 
at programs where the participants obtain work experience and training as the 
more successful ones. Nonetheless, we cannot exclude that our ranking of the 
programs are affected by spurious correlation. In particular, we found some in-
dications that participants in Self employment grants (SEMP) may have better 
employment prospect due to unobserved characteristics than participants in 
other programs. We found that observed characteristics are more important that 
Employment office affiliation in explaining the relative probability to enter 
SEMP. This result may indicate the selection of  participants to SEMP is also 
based on unobserved characteristics related to the outcome. We also found that 
the average pre-unemployment wage level is higher in SEMP than in programs.  
A second explanation is that work experience and training at an employer 
actually is better than classroom vocational training. A possibility to show ones 
competence or an opportunity of on-the-job training might be more important 
in improving the prospects of receiving a job offer than “formal” vocational 
training. Presumably, valuable information is revealed to both the employer 
and the worker when the latter spends time in the program at the working site. 
Further, the more regular work the worker is allowed to do while in program, 
the more information on the match is revealed. A recent evaluation study on 
vocational training supports the conclusion that employer contacts are impor-
tant for receiving a job offer. Johansson and Martinsson (2000) find that voca-
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tional training (computer training) located at, and organized by, private firms 
have a much better outcome in terms of employment probabilities than tradi-
tional classroom vocational training.  
Classroom vocational training is the most expensive program in Sweden. 
The high cost in combination with the poor relative performance of vocational 
training brings up the question whether vocational training is a social beneficial 
activity. An answer, however, demands that vocational training is evaluated in 
several other aspects as well. For example, we need to know whether voca-
tional training shortens unemployment spells compared with non-participation 
and whether participation increases subsequent employment and earnings. Pre-
vious Swedish studies on the effects of vocational training compared with non-
participation give mixed results, see Regnér (1997) for an overview. The study 
by Regnér, which is the most recent one, shows that vocational training has a 
negative effect on (annual) income (compared with non-participation) one year 
after participation. The negative effects vanish after three years. Korpi (1994) 
uses a sample of young unemployed Swedish worker and find that participation 
in classroom vocational training and relief work increase subsequent employ-
ment duration. Unfortunately, Korpi does not distinguish between the two types 
of programs.  
Further, programs might have effects on non-participants as well, see Calm-
fors (1994). For example, programs must to be financed and may hence in-
crease the tax burden. Programs may also affect the wage level and the wage 
structure in the economy. Further, the improved employment prospects of par-
ticipants may come at the cost of reduced prospects of non-participants di-
rectly. These effects need not to be same across programs. There is only frag-
mentary evidence on the effects on non-participants of various programs. 
Dahlberg and Forslund (2000) use Swedish data over the period 1987-1996 and 
find that are direct displacement effect from programs that generate subsidized 
labor, but there seems to be no displacement effects from vocational training 
programs.  
In order to understand the poor relative performance of vocational training 
more research in needed. Possibly vocational training is of poor quality or is 
not targeted on occupation in excess demand. On this issue there is, however, 
no evidence available.  IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  29
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Appendix A 

















          
Age (years)  39.95 37.56 36.93 36.33 41.36 39.26 39.00  39.79 
Women (%)  33.79 28.03 77.55 51.77 44.39 39.26 48.09  62.15 
Immigrants from Eastern Europé 
(%) 
1.67 9.15 0.92 20.71 1.52 13.22 8.72 4.70 
Immigrants from Africa and Asia 
(%) 




Compulsory school (%)  27.69 34.09 26.82 36.69 41.55 40.06 30.41  36.29 
Upper sec: (0-2 years) (%)  21.69 24.65 27.76 18.45 23.95 23.16 23.51  28.23 
Upper sec. (>2 years) (%)  23.20 23.06 11.16 24.17 16.38 19.78 23.53  19.81 
University (0-2 years) (%)  6.92 4.77 7.57 4.42 5.35 3.88 6.37  4.52 




Short work experience (%)  9.06 12.92 19.79 16.38 11.46 16.60 13.93  15.28 
Long work experience (%)  82.32 73.16 66.53 54.48 77.80 61.13 70.61  66.89 
Relevant education/training  
for the work (%) 
73.22 64.51 67.87 64.90 58.90 69.18 65.06 58.33 
 
Benefits and wages 
  
Receiver  of cash assistance (%)  6.99 15.01 7.57 4.94 3.81 8.95 6.16  2.48 
Receiver of UI-benefits (%)  67.42 54.08 64.41 44.94 88.13 53.68 63.89  67.32 
Previous wage (SEK/day)  771 697 659 696 720 685 713  698 
    
Assigned code 12  6.93 11.05 4.14 26.64 4.50 14.78 14.42  11.83 
Number of participants  3 048 1 006 753 5 383 5 006 1 006 6 251  2 827 
 IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  33
Table A2. Results. Estimates pertaining to the control variables. Total number 
of observations are 17 303 individuals. Offices are included if they contributed 
100 or more participants. For each program the T-value is shown as the devia-




SEMP SUBE TRS API  ALU  RW  AMU  CAC 
work relevant training  0.052 0.29 0.35 0.03 0.45 0.57 0.38 0.07 0.94
Some work experience  0.055 0.05 0.75 1.08 1.96 0.96 0.93 0.61 1.33
long work experience  0.108 0.60 0.08 0.63 0.67 0.94 0.17 0.74 1.64
KAS 0.122 1.45 1.91 0.69 1.09 1.07 0.56 0.54 1.18
UI-benefits -0.015 2.18 0.46 1.07 2.69 2.02 0.91 1.05 3.20
Unempl. dur. prior to 
program (days) 
-0.082 1.89 1.83 1.02 0.66 3.51 0.30 0.54 2.43
Immigrants from 
East. Europe 
-0.415 1.81 0.65 0.39 1.13 1.16 0.07 0.28 0.52
Immigrants from  
Africa and Asia 
-0.401 1.01 0.42 0.59 0.21 0.02 2.11 0.20 1.74
30-34 years  -0.117 0.57 2.14 0.31 1.37 0.07 1.50 0.48 0.55
35-39 years  -0.166 1.47 1.03 0.82 2.11 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.84
40-44 years  -0.194 1.51 0.91 0.71 0.96 1.19 0.03 0.17 0.45
45-49 years  -0.286 1.84 1.34 0.66 0.02 1.47 0.17 0.01 0.67
50-54 years  -0.400 2.70 2.91 0.64 0.04 1.47 0.69 1.04 1.14
Upper sec:(0-2 years)  0.083 1.61 0.40 2.73 0.02 0.90 2.49 0.25 0.24
Upper sec:(>2 years)  0.087 1.50 0.17 1.44 1.06 0.42 2.49 0.16 0.53
University (0-2 years)  0.083 0.61 0.08 1.42 0.14 0.47 1.17 0.14 0.83
University (>2 years)  0.159 1.94 0.13 2.02 0.24 0.92 1.20 0.23 0.32
Women -0.027 1.18 0.65 0.48 0.01 0.06 0.54 0.51 2.07
Local unemployment 
rate (log) 
-0.149 0.34 0.85 0.96 0.64 0.71 2.13 0.55 0.77
Local program-to-
unemployment rate 
-0.121 0.04 1.78 0.19 0.46 0.68 0.13 0.24 1.03
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Table A2 (Cont.). Results. Estimates pertaining to the control variables. Total 
number of observations are 17 303 individuals. Offices are included if they con-
tributed 100 or more participants. For each program the T-value is shown as 
the deviation from the overall estimate. 
Assigned code 12  -0.241 1.31 0.57 2.07 1.46 0.50 0.99 0.33 0.37
Wage prior to unem-
ployment 
-0.000 0.12 0.09 0.04 1.14 1.26 2.07 0.03 1.98
    
#  of  observations  17303 1689 552 414 3211 2695 496 6800 1446
Notes: Variable in bold whenever there is strong indications of heterogeneous effects. 
Not shown in Table is the Office factor (103 levels), the county factor (20 levels), and 
the code for the sector where work is sought (12 levels). Moreover, calendar time ef-
fects are accounted for by use of the date of entry to the program. IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  35
Appendix B 
This appendix gives a brief description of the multinomial logit model (MLM), 
see Greene (1993) for a more detailed description. MLM provides estimates of 
the set of probabilities that the worker enters the programs j=0,…,7. The prob-
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where Xi is the worker’s observed characteristics. These characteristics are ob-
tained at interviews between the caseworker and the worker. The X-vector in-
cludes all variables presented in table A1 except indicators on membership in 
unemployment benefit fund, eligibility for KAS. The variables are described in 
more detail in section 3. The factor Yi indicates the Employment office affilia-
tion of the worker with a level for each office. The vector Zi includes various 
indicators on local labor market conditions, as well as elapsed unemployment 
duration, indicators on membership in unemployment benefit fund, eligibility 
for KAS, and the worker’s most preferred occupation (one digit-level), see sec-
tion 2. F denotes the multivariate logistic cumulative distribution function. Fi-
nally, β j, α  j, and δ  j are the parameters to be estimated. The relative probability 
that worker i will enter program j instead of program 0 (the comparison pro-
gram) is given by: 
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We decompose the variance of the log-transformed predicted relative probabili-
ties into three categories: i) worker characteristics, X  ii) Employment office af-
filiation, Y  iii) other variables Z.  
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where remainder R consists of possible covariance between X, Y, and Z. We run 
eight estimations on (B1), switching the comparison program each time. By do-IFAU – The relative efficiency of labor market programs  36
ing so, we relate all eight programs to each other. One single estimation gives 
the relationship between the comparison program and one of the 7 other pro-
grams, but not the relation between the 7 programs. The measure presented in 
Table 4 gives the relative contribution of office affiliation and observed worker 











If  M > 1  we conclude that worker’s Office affiliation is more important than 
the worker’s characteristics to explain why he enters program j instead of the 
comparison program 0.  
 